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Abstract 
The roles of authoritarianism, social dominance orientation (SDO), and 
prejudice in the prediction of far-right support were examined in Europe and 
the United States (U.S.). A meta-analysis shows remarkably similar, positive 
and strong associations of far-right support with these three variables in 
previous studies conducted in Europe, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the 
United States. Results from two cross-sectional studies in the U.S. further 
indicated that higher levels of authoritarianism and SDO related to higher 
voting intentions and support for Trump, via increased prejudice. In a three-
wave longitudinal study in the U.K., authoritarianism and SDO predicted pro-
Brexit attitudes and support for the United Kingdom Independence Party, 
again via prejudice. These results shed a new light on the widely-held beliefs 
in “American and British exceptionalism”, as Trump and Brexit adherents 
share the same social-psychological underpinnings as far-right supporters 
observed in several European countries. 
 
Key words: Trump; Brexit; authoritarianism; social dominance orientation; 
ethnic prejudice 
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THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF 
 FAR-RIGHT SUPPORT IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES  
 
All nations, their elections, and their political decisions can be regarded 
as “exceptional” given each nation’s unique history. Yet “American 
exceptionalism” has long been an especially powerful and persistent 
conviction of American thought (Lipset, 1996). The term has historically 
referred to the belief that the United States (U.S.) differs qualitatively from 
other developed nations because of its national credo, historical evolution, 
and distinctive political and religious institutions. In particular, French 
political scientist and historian Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) coined the 
American economic-political system of peaceful capitalism as being sui 
generis.  
Similarly, the United Kingdom (U.K.) has often been seen as “the odd 
one out” in European politics. This led scholars and policy makers to use the 
label “British exceptionalism” (Eatwell, 2000). Theoretically, comparisons 
between political party support in the U.S., the U.K., and other European 
countries have largely been discouraged due to the fact that American and 
British exceptionalism were taken for granted and the political systems 
differed sharply (Hoffmann, 2011). However, the unanticipated presidential 
victory of Donald Trump and the decision of the British people to leave the 
European Union (i.e., the Brexit referendum) call into question these deeply-
held American and British beliefs. Did similar social-psychological 
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mechanisms drive Trump and Brexit adherents? Were the underpinnings of 
recent far-right support comparable to previous elections in other European 
democracies? This paper addresses these questions. 
First, we conducted a meta-analysis examining the correlates of far-
right support in previous studies on Trump, Brexit, and European far-right 
parties with three important social-psychological predictors: outgroup 
prejudice and two indicators of right-wing ideologies - resistance to change 
and support for social conservatism, indicated by right-wing authoritarianism 
(RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), and preferences for group-based dominance and 
inequality, indicated by social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Indeed, in Western contexts, stronger 
endorsement of right-wing ideological attitudes is usually expressed by 
higher levels of these two related dimensions, as measured with the RWA 
and SDO scales. We focus on these ideological dimensions as they typically 
reflect attitudes regarding the traditional left/right alignment on which 
political parties, politicians and issues can be located, and they are generally 
considered to be strong predictors of support for left-wing (i.e. lower RWA 
and SDO scores) versus right-wing (i.e. higher RWA and SDO scores) parties 
(Duckitt, 2001). 
Second, we administered the same variables to two samples of adult 
Americans (one collected before and one after the 2016 election), testing a 
mediation model with RWA and SDO relating to Trump support via prejudice. 
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Finally, we applied our model to another recent victory of the far-right. 
Specifically, we collected a unique, large three-wave longitudinal sample of 
British adults that examined the predictors of pro-Brexit attitudes and 
support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). In total, we 
shed light on the attitudinal composition of far-right supporters, both with 
earlier and more recent electoral events and in both American and European 
political contexts. 
The social-psychological bases of Trump and Brexit support 
Far-right politics are politics further on the right of the left-right spectrum 
than the “standard” political right, particularly in terms of ultraconservative, 
ultranationalist, and xenophobic tendencies (Ivarsflaten, 2008; McClosky & 
Chong, 1985). Far-right political parties and politicians often advocate 
authoritarian ideologies alongside oppression of outgroups based on their 
perceived threat to the majority ethnic-cultural group, or the nation as a whole 
(see Golder, 2016). 
Since his appearance on the political stage, various studies have 
investigated the psycho-political profile of Donald Trump and his adherents, 
examining whether these share similar characteristics with those of far-right 
politic(ian)s. These investigations concluded consistently that authoritarian and 
anti-egalitarian attitudes are potent predictors of Trump support. Eight months 
prior to the election, MacWilliams (2016) correctly predicted that routine 
election surveys were underestimating Trump’s support; he relied on his survey 
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finding that high authoritarians were strongly in favor of Trump. During the 
presidential primaries in February 2016, Feldman (2017) also found a positive 
relation between authoritarianism and favorable evaluations of Trump among 
Republican primary voters. None of the evaluations of the other primary 
candidates revealed such a strong connection. 
Following Duckitt’s (2001) Dual Process Model, Trump appeals to high 
authoritarians because they seek politicians that protect law and order, defend 
traditional and religious values, and react negatively and even aggressively 
towards norm violators. On the other hand, Trump’s rhetoric also attracts 
people high in SDO, as they particularly favor competition-based social 
inequality and group dominance (e.g., free market capitalism and anti-welfare 
policies). Later studies replicated these findings. For instance, Choma and 
Hanoch (2017) and Crowson and Brandes (2017) found that RWA and SDO 
correlated highly with the intention to vote for Trump. The remarkable 
consistency across these studies is noteworthy because they employed different 
measures of the key variables. The first two studies cited above employed 
Feldman’s political science measure of authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 
1997), while the Choma-Hanoch and Crowson-Brandes studies used standard 
social-psychological items. All these studies also employed somewhat different 
SDO items, and tapped into mere Trump support as well as intentions to vote 
for him. 
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We conclude that Trump’s rhetoric particularly appeals to those with 
higher levels of RWA, SDO, and prejudice. Indeed, by defending traditional 
American values, emphasizing concerns about national security, and portraying 
immigrants as a threat to the dominant economic position of the U.S., he 
strongly appeals to the motives of those with right-wing authoritarian and 
socially dominant attitudes (Womick, Rothmund, Azevedo, King, & Jost, 2018). 
Moreover, his prejudicial views and statements also attract a fair share of 
voters that have negative views on immigration, immigrants, and other 
outgroups alike (Kellner, 2016). Moreover, such negative outgroup attitudes 
have been shown to mediate the link between right-wing ideologies and far-
right support (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). In other words, ethnic prejudice can 
be considered one of the vital processes that explains why individuals high in 
RWA and SDO are attracted by far-right political alternatives.  
As such, voting intentions for Trump represent a behavioral expression of 
underlying prejudicial attitudes, which have their roots in two underlying types 
of right-wing ideologies (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). 
Therefore, we hypothesize that prejudice serves as a mediating process 
through which RWA and SDO are positively related to Trump support. An 
overview of research findings linking RWA, SDO, and prejudice to Trump 
support is provided in the upper panel of Table 1. 
 Turning to the U.K. context, only a few studies have investigated the 
associations of RWA and SDO with Brexit support (see Table 1, middle panel). 
 8 
Across two cross-sectional samples, de Zavala, Guerra, and Simão (2017) 
found strong and positive correlations of these ideological attitudes with 
support for the outcome of the referendum. Similarly, Peitz, Dhont, and Seyd 
(2018) revealed positive associations of RWA and SDO with preferences for 
harsh laws on immigration and control during the Brexit negotiations. One 
study (Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, 2017) identified a link between anti-
immigrant stances and “Leave” voting intentions. 
Via ethnic prejudice, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
likely played a similar role in the extent to which British citizens supported the 
UKIP party. Indeed, similar to Trump’s discourse (Reicher & Haslam, 2016), 
UKIP’s manifesto embraces nationalist beliefs and nativist, reactionary views, 
and is characterized by a strong anti-immigrant platform (UKIP, 2013). One can 
assume this party program attracts voters with right-wing ideologies (i.e., high 
RWA and/or SDO) and high levels of prejudice (see Goodwin & Milazzo, 2015; 
Tournier-Sol, 2015). 
 Taken together, we propose that common psychological factors rooted in 
right-wing ideologies and prejudiced attitudes underpin both Trump and Brexit 
support in ways that have been observed previously in studies on far-right 
support across the European continent. Before addressing the assumption of 
American and British exceptionalism, we start with summarizing prior research 
that has investigated right-wing ideologies, prejudice, and support for the 
political far-right.  
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Comparable European results for far-right followers 
 As the lower panel of Table 1 indicates, the joint power of RWA and SDO 
to predict far-right voting has also been repeatedly found in European research: 
in Belgium and France (e.g., Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002; Swyngedouw & Giles, 
2007; Van Hiel, 2012; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002), the Netherlands (e.g., 
Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015; Van Assche, Dhont, Van Hiel, & Roets, 2018), Poland 
and Germany (e.g., Schmidt, Darowska, & Fischer, 2017), and Italy (e.g., 
Leone, Desimoni & Chirumbolo, 2014). Notably, such positive associations have 
also been found in other countries around the world, such as Taiwan 
(Kuomingtang support; Liu, Huang, & McFedries, 2008), Israel (Likud support; 
Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010), and New Zealand (NZ First support; 
Duckitt et al., 2010; Sibley & Wilson, 2007). 
The social-cultural and economic-hierarchical dimensions of right-wing 
thought thus constitute the core social-attitudinal bases for far-right voting. 
European far-right politicians and parties tend to propagate a range of similar 
right-wing values, expressing fears over the protection of the ingroup’s 
traditional culture, and its current economic, competitive position within society 
(Meloen, Van der Linden, & De Witte, 1996; Van Hiel, Cornelis, Roets, & De 
Clercq, 2007). As such, they tend to attract most support from people who 
strongly resist cultural changes and endorse inequality - the ones scoring high 
on RWA and SDO (see Duckitt, 2001).  
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In addition, those holding authoritarian and socially dominant belief 
systems are also mobilized by the far-right through fierce anti-immigrant 
rhetoric together with outspoken negativity towards ethnic outgroups 
(Ivarsflaten, 2008). Indeed, prejudice has been highlighted as one of the key 
processes through which right-wing individuals become supportive of far-right 
political parties in Western Europe (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). This recurrent 
result invites a meta-analysis that estimates the magnitude of these effect sizes 




We used a variety of search strategies to garner studies for our meta-
analysis. First, we searched the databases ISI Web of Knowledge and Google 
Scholar for studies published until January 2019, employing a large array of key 
words in various combinations.1 Studies had to meet four inclusion criteria. (1) 
They had to comprise heterogeneous samples of non-immigrant citizens, and 
(2) assess at least one of our three predictor variables. (3) In addition, voting 
intentions or support for the far-right politician or political party had to be 
administered on a Likert-scale rather than coded as a categorical variable (see 
e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2015). (4) A final inclusion criterion was that samples 
had to be statistically independent; that is, participants in one study could not 
be part of another study.2 The twenty studies included in the meta-analysis 
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reported data from k = 27 samples with a total of N = 15,252 participants (and 
are highlighted by a “†” sign in the reference list). We tested a random effects 
model using the Open Psychometric Meta-analysis software (Version 1.0b9) by 
Wiernik (2017). We corrected for statistical artifacts using the artifact 
distribution method and freely estimated the true residual variance (SDres). 
Results 
Table 2 portrays all effect sizes with their observed and true standard 
deviations, and their confidence and credibility3 intervals. The meta-analytic 
results reveal a similar pattern of results in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe: 
RWA, SDO, and prejudice are all strongly and positively related to far-right 
support across both continents. For all variables, the confidence intervals for 
the effect sizes in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe overlap, so we can 
conclude that effect sizes did not substantially differ between those contexts. 
Although the association of RWA with far-right support tends to be 
slightly larger in the British than European samples, the relation between 
SDO and far-right support tends to be slightly larger in the American 
compared to the British samples, and the prejudice-far-right link tends to be 
slightly larger in Europe as opposed to the U.S., these differences are small 
and not significant. 
Preliminary conclusion 
It could thus be concluded that our three key predictors show 
comparable associations with far-right support, both in past and recent 
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studies and in Europe as well as the U.S. and U.K. These strong and highly 
consistent relations arise in spite of markedly different political histories, 
cultures and systems across these various nations. 
Study 2 
Bringing together various pieces of the puzzle, Cornelis and Van Hiel 
(2015) revealed earlier that prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes partly 
mediated the relationships of authoritarianism and SDO with far-right voting 
behavior. We tested in Studies 2 and 3 whether this model holds for the 
more recent far-right victories in the U.S. and U.K. In particular, we 
hypothesized that prejudice partly explains the positive associations of both 
RWA and SDO with intentions to vote for Trump before the U.S. 2016 
elections (Study 2a), support for Trump after the elections (Study 2b), and 
support for UKIP and Brexit (Study 3). 
Method 
Participants 
As it is vital to test our hypothesized model both before and after the 
U.S. elections, and it is valuable to replicate our findings, we collected data 
at two time points. Data for Study 2a were collected online via Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) during September 2016 (6 weeks before the presidential 
elections) and data for Study 2b were collected via the same platform during 
March 2017 (4 months after the elections). In Study 2a, the sample 
comprised 160 American citizens, with a mean age of 36 years (SD = 
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11.30). Forty-two percent of the participants were women; 9% had 
completed primary school, 38% had completed high school and 53% had a 
college or university degree. Ninety percent of the sample had a 
White/European ethnic background, 7% was Asian American, 2% was Native 
American, and 1% of the respondents indicated an “other” background. 
Participants with a Black/African background (N = 6) were excluded from the 
analyses, as our measure of prejudice comprised an anti-Black modern 
racism scale.  
In Study 2b, the sample comprised 252 American citizens, with a 
mean age of 37 years (SD = 12.42), and 45% women. Seventy-seven 
percent of the sample had a White/European ethnic background, 9% was 
Asian American, 7% was Hispanic/Latino American, 5% was Black/African 
American, and 2% of the respondents identified themselves as “other” 
background. Participants with a Black/African background were not excluded 
here, as our prejudice measure comprised a general anti-immigrant affect 
scale. Across both studies, all participants completed the full questionnaire, 
yielding no missing data. Based on the meta-analytic estimates of Study 1, 
both sample sizes give us a power of > .95 to detect the hypothesized 
effects. 
Measures 
 All items were rated on seven-point Likert scales anchored by one 
(totally disagree) and seven (totally agree). 
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Right-Wing Authoritarianism. In both Studies 2a and 2b, a 9-item 
RWA-scale was administered, tapping into the three authoritarianism-facets 
(Duckitt et al., 2010). A sample item is: “Obedience and respect for 
authority are the most important virtues children should learn.” Cronbach’s 
alpha was .93 in Study 2a and .95 in Study 2b, with M2A = 3.27 (SD2A = 
1.58) and M2B = 3.58 (SD2B = 1.76). 
Social Dominance Orientation. In both Studies 2a and 2b, a short 
four-item version of the SDO-7 scale was included (Ho et al., 2015). A 
sample item is: “An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and 
others to be on the bottom.” Cronbach’s alpha was .89 in both Study 2a and 
2b, with M2A = 2.71 (SD2A = 1.69) and M2B = 2.82 (SD2B = 1.66). 
Prejudice. In Study 2a, we administered a 7-item Modern Racism 
scale (McConahay, 1986). A sample item reads: “Discrimination against 
blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.” Cronbach’s alpha of this 
scale was .92, with M = 2.80 (SD = 1.51). In Study 2b, we tapped into anti-
immigrant attitudes with a modified version of the General Evaluation Scale 
(e.g., Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). This scale asked 
participants to describe their overall feelings towards immigrants on four 
differential scales: cold–warm, negative–positive, hostile–friendly and 
contemptuous–respectful (see also Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 
2014). The items were coded so that higher scores indicated more negative 
attitudes, resulting in a reliable index (α = .96), with M = 3.16 (SD = 1.72).  
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Far-right support. In Study 2a, respondents indicated to what extent 
they agreed with the statement: “In the upcoming election, I will likely vote 
for Donald Trump” (M = 2.61, SD = 2.36). In Study 2b, the far-right support 
item read “I support the program and/or ideas of Donald Trump” (M = 2.92, 
SD = 2.16). 
Results 
The first two rows of Table 1 provide the correlations of all study 
variables with intentions to vote for Trump (row 1) and support for Trump 
(row 2). Across both samples, Americans’ intentions to vote for and support 
Trump were positively related to RWA, SDO, modern racism, and anti-
immigrant attitudes.  
Second, we estimated the indirect effects of RWA and SDO via 
prejudice on voting intentions (Study 2a) and on support for Trump (Study 
2b). To do so, we employed path analyses with maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation using MPlus (version 7.1; Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Standard 
errors were computed using bootstrapping (N = 50,000 bootstrap samples).  
 Summarized in Figures 1a and 1b, the results reveal that RWA and 
SDO are both strongly related to prejudice, and prejudice is further related 
to voting intentions and support for Trump. Most importantly, the bootstrap 
analyses indicated that outgroup prejudice mediates both the relationship 
between RWA and intentions to vote for Trump (indirect effect: b = 0.17; 
CI95 = [0.07; 0.31]; p = .02), and the relationship between SDO and 
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intentions to vote for Trump (indirect effect: b = 0.40; CI95 = [0.22; 0.60]; 
p < .001) before the elections. Similarly, anti-immigrant attitudes mediated 
both the associations between RWA and Trump support (indirect effect: b = 
0.09; CI95 = [0.04; 0.15]; p = .02), and between SDO and Trump support 
(indirect effect: b = 0.08; CI95 = [0.02; 0.15]; p = .04) after the elections. 
The direct paths from RWA to voting intentions and support for Trump 
remained significant (b = 0.43; CI95 = [0.16; 0.69]; p = .009 in Study 2a 
and b = 0.58; CI95 = [0.44; 0.71]; p < .001 in Study 2b), while the direct 
paths from SDO to these outcomes were not significant. 
These cross-sectional results provide preliminary and tentative 
evidence for a potential mediation effect. Longitudinal designs are needed to 
clarify the specific processes at play. 
Study 3 
 Study 3 extends Study 2 in two ways. First, the predictive value of our 
model was tested in another recent far-right political debate - the U.K.’s 
Brexit referendum. We tapped into two outcomes - both pro-Brexit attitudes 
and support for the UKIP party. Second, so as to examine the underlying 
processes over time, we collected a three-wave longitudinal sample and 
applied a longitudinal cross-lagged panel design with three measurement 





We used a nationally heterogeneous sample of non-immigrant English 
citizens using the online crowd sourcing platform Prolific Academic. The data 
were collected three months before the Brexit referendum (March 2016), in 
the weeks after the Brexit (end of June – beginning of July 2016), and six 
months after the Brexit referendum (December 2016) - henceforth referred 
to as time 1 (T1), time 2 (T2) and time 3 (T3) respectively4. Respondents at 
T1 were 603 adults, with a mean age of 34 years (SD = 11.43), and 38% 
men. Of the T1 respondents, 432 (72%) participated in the next wave (T2), 
and 341 (57%) in the final wave (T3) of data-collection. 
Measures 
 All items were rated on seven-point scales anchored by one (totally 
disagree) and seven (totally agree). All measures relevant for our study 
were part of a longer survey on social and political issues. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism. A 9-item RWA-scale was 
administered (Duckitt et al., 2010). A reverse-coded sample item reads: 
“It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority.” 
Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .85 at T1, .87 at T2, and .88 at T3, with 
MT1 = 3.56 (SDT1 = 1.09), MT2 = 3.54 (SDT2 = 1.13), and MT3 = 3.56 (SDT3 = 
1.13). 
Social Dominance Orientation. An eight-item SDO scale was 
included (Ho et al., 2015). A sample item reads: “Some groups of people are 
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simply inferior to other groups.” Cronbach’s alpha of this scale was .86 at 
T1, .87 at T2, and .90 at T3, with MT1 = 2.83 (SDT1 = 1.10), MT2 = 2.76 
(SDT2 = 1.08), and MT3 = 2.83 (SDT3 = 1.16). 
Prejudice. We assessed the same scale as in Study 2b. The items 
were coded so that higher scores indicated more anti-immigrant attitudes, 
resulting in a reliable index (αT1 = .93; αT2 and αT3= .95), with MT1 = 3.09 
(SDT1 = 1.34), MT2 = 2.78 (SDT2 = 1.36), and MT3 = 2.84 (SDT3 = 1.27). 
Far-right support. To assess respondents’ support for the far-right 
party in the U.K., the following question was posed: “To what extent do you 
support the program and/or manifesto of the U.K. Independence Party” 
(UKIP; MT1 = 2.49, SDT1 = 1.73; MT2 = 2.34, SDT2 = 1.74; and MT3 = 2.44, 
SDT3 = 1.70). To assess pro-Brexit attitudes, respondents indicated to what 
extent they agreed with the statement: “I think the United Kingdom should 
remain a member of the European Union.”. This item was reverse coded, 
with MT1 = 3.14 (SDT1 = 2.13), MT2 = 3.05 (SDT2 = 2.53), and MT3 = 3.26 
(SDT3 = 2.57). 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
We conducted multivariate analyses of variance to test whether T1 scores 
of RWA, SDO, anti-immigrant attitudes, and UKIP and Brexit support differed 
between the respondents who completed the survey at T2 and T3, those who 
also completed T2 but not T3, and those who only completed the T1 
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questionnaire. We found no multivariate differences between the groups (all Fs 
< 2.80, all ps > .06). Therefore, all respondents who participated at Time 1 (N 
= 603) were included in the subsequent analyses.  
Longitudinal analyses 
Cross-lagged analyses. First, we performed longitudinal cross-lagged 
analyses with latent variables in MPlus (version 7.1; Muthén & Muthén, 
2012) using the MLR likelihood estimator, and FIML to deal with missing 
data. Item subsets were averaged into parcels to smooth measurement 
error and maintain an adequate ratio of cases-to-parameters. We created 
three parcels each for RWA and SDO and two for prejudice, held constant 
over time.  
 We tested two models, one focusing on UKIP support (Model 1) and 
the other focusing on pro-Brexit attitudes (Model 2). In both models we 
included all paths from the T1 scores to T2 scores and from T2 scores to T3 
scores. This allowed us to test the hypothesized indirect effects of T1 scores 
of RWA and SDO on the T3 scores of UKIP support (Model 1) and pro-Brexit 
attitudes (Model 2) via the T2 scores of prejudice. In both models we 
controlled for the stability effects of all variables over time (i.e., including 
the autoregressive paths) as well as for the associations between the 
variables within each wave (i.e., including the cross-sectional associations). 
Furthermore, we constrained the paths from T2 to T3 to be equal to the 
paths from T1 to T2 (i.e., the stationarity assumption; Cole & Maxwell, 
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2003). The model fits were acceptable for both models (χ²(318) = 1122.00 
and 1131.03, both p < .001; RMSEA = .078 and .078, CFI = .901 and .902 
for Model 1 and 2, respectively). Figures 2a and 2b present the standardized 
estimates of the models examining UKIP support and pro-Brexit attitudes, 
respectively.  
In line with our expectations, we found longitudinal relations of RWA and 
SDO at T1 and T2 with, respectively, anti-immigrant attitudes at T2 and T3, 
demonstrating the hypothesized paths from the predictors to the mediator. 
Furthermore, anti-immigrant attitudes at T1 and T2 showed a strong 
association with, respectively, far-right support at T2 and T3, demonstrating 
the hypothesized paths from the mediator to the criterion variables.  
Importantly, longitudinal mediation analyses revealed an indirect effect of 
RWA and SDO at T1 on UKIP support at T3, through anti-immigrant attitudes at 
T2 (indirect effect of RWA: b = 0.02; CI95 = [0.004; 0.04]; p = .04; indirect 
effect of SDO: b = 0.02; CI95 = [0.003; 0.04]; p = .05). Furthermore, similar 
indirect effects were obtained for Brexit support (indirect effect of RWA, b = 
0.01; CI95 = [0.002; 0.02]; p = .03; indirect effect of SDO: b = 0.01; CI95 = 
[0.001; 0.02]; p = .04).  
Growth curve analyses. A second, complementary analytic strategy 
involved testing a random intercept multilevel model with respondent as level-2 
grouping identifier (see Preacher, Zhang, & Zyphur, 2011). Evidence for 
correlated slopes (i.e., change associated with change) indicates a common 
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underlying growth (Berry & Willoughby, 2016). In other words, we tested 
whether the slopes from RWA and SDO to prejudice were positively associated 
with the slopes from prejudice to far-right support. At the within-level, we 
regressed (a) prejudice on RWA or SDO; (b) UKIP or Brexit support on 
prejudice, and (c) UKIP or Brexit support on RWA or SDO. We defined the 
respective random slopes and estimated their means at the between-level. 
Furthermore, we estimated the level-2 correlation of slopes “a” (from predictor 
to mediator) and “b” (from mediator to outcome) as a first indicator of common 
underlying growth. Finally, we computed the indirect effect by multiplying the 
means of the slopes “a” and “b” and adding their correlation, as such providing 
additional information concerning our mediation hypotheses. 
We found significant slopes from RWA to prejudice (b = 0.40; CI95 = 
[0.33; 0.47]; p < .001), from SDO to prejudice (b = 0.32; CI95 = [0.25; 0.39]; 
p < .001), from prejudice to UKIP support (b = 0.19; CI95 = [0.09; 0.30]; p = 
.003), and from prejudice to Brexit support (b = 0.18; CI95 = [0.07; 0.30]; p = 
.01). Most importantly, we found positive correlations between the “a” and “b” 
slopes, together with indirect effects of right-wing attitudes on far-right support 
through prejudice. Specifically, the covariances between the RWA-prejudice and 
prejudice-UKIP slope (r = .02; p = .04; indirect effect: b = 0.10; CI95 = [0.05; 
0.15]; p = .002), between the SDO-prejudice and prejudice-UKIP slope (r = 
.04; p = .003; indirect effect: b = 0.10; CI95 = [0.06; 0.13]; p < .001), 
between the RWA-prejudice and prejudice-Brexit slope (r = .02; p = .15; 
 22 
indirect effect: b = 0.09; CI95 = [0.03; 0.15]; p = .01), and between the SDO-
prejudice and prejudice-Brexit slope (r = .03; p = .03; indirect effect: b = 
0.08; CI95 = [0.03; 0.12]; p = .003) all indicated a common underlying growth. 
In sum, RWA and SDO were associated with higher levels of prejudice 
over time, which in turn, were longitudinally associated with stronger support 
for UKIP and Brexit. Interestingly, we also found longitudinal relations of far-
right support with right-wing attitudes and prejudice. In particular, UKIP and 
Brexit support also related to higher RWA and prejudice scores over time. 
Discussion 
Putting American and British exceptionalism into perspective 
 First, we have seen that the results of multiple studies of Europe’s far-
right-wing voters are strikingly similar to American and British data on the 2016 
election. Authoritarianism, social dominance attitudes, and prejudice have been 
routinely found to correlate with far-right voting in nations throughout Europe. 
These voters share with Trump supporters similar views on social-cultural 
issues, anti-egalitarian societal structures, and immigrants. Indeed, the three 
major grievances of Europe’s far-right also arise from threats to traditional 
norms and values, economic changes, and immigration – with immigration the 
most intense issue (Swyngedouw, & Giles, 2001). Our meta-analytic findings 
(Study 1) suggest that the same can be said about the Trump and Brexit 
movements.  
 23 
These close similarities put into perspective the widespread beliefs in 
American and British exceptionalism. Indeed, the parallels between the 
European support of far-right politicians, American support for Trump, and 
British support for UKIP pose serious questions: Just how different are 
American or British beliefs in democracy from those of Europeans and the rest 
of the world at large? Just how different are the nationalistic and populist 
adherents of Trump and Farage’s UKIP from those supporting Le Pen’s National 
Front in France, Wilder’s Freedom Party in the Netherlands, or Meuthen’s 
Alternative for Germany? Such questions would never have even been asked 
prior to the 2016 elections in the U.K. and U.S. 
Authoritarianism and SDO and far-right support  
Our findings in Study 2 and Study 3 further lead to two firm conclusions. 
First, individuals’ voting intentions and support for either Trump or UKIP are 
similarly entrenched in their ideological beliefs and their attitudes towards other 
ethnic groups. In particular, applying Duckitt’s (2001) Dual Process Model to 
these far-right successes, high authoritarians support and vote for Trump and 
UKIP because they believe this politician/party can protect law and order and 
defend traditional norms and values, and high social dominators particularly 
favor those options because they want to protect the (economic) dominance 
and higher status of the majority ingroup. Second, we can conclude that 
prejudicial attitudes to a large extent explain the relationships of 
authoritarianism and SDO with such far-right support. Indeed, the reason that 
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individuals high in RWA and SDO choose far-right is (at least in part) because 
these far-right alternatives also propagate tough anti-immigrant stances.  
Our results concerning the role of these three variables in voting 
intentions for Trump are not too surprising, as Trump’s speeches contain many 
classic authoritarian and SDO statements. Furthermore, these speeches often 
disseminate nationalistic “America First” messages (Kellner, 2016) along with 
negative comments about outgroups ranging from “dangerous” Muslim 
immigrants to Mexican “rapists” (Pettigrew, 2017). Similar reasoning can be 
applied to the success of the UKIP party, whose Brexit propaganda also aimed 
to spread feelings of symbolic and realistic threat and anti-immigrant sentiment 
(Mudde, 2016). 
Cornelis and Van Hiel (2015) showed that prejudice and anti-immigrant 
attitudes were the key processes through which individuals adhering to right-
wing views were inclined to vote for far-right parties in Western Europe. Our 
primary objective was to shed light on what drives Americans to support Trump 
and British citizens to support Brexit - two of the most debated and influential 
political events in recent electoral history (Pettigrew, 2017). Our findings, 
pointing to the importance of authoritarianism, SDO, and prejudice in the 
prediction of these recent far-right triumphs, replicate those of Cornelis and 
Van Hiel (2015). 
Our findings also move beyond the Cornelis and Van Hiel (2015) study by 
providing the first longitudinal empirical evidence supporting the claim that 
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RWA and SDO over time relate to greater far-right support through increased 
outgroup prejudice. Remarkably, initial far-right support also related to greater 
post-referendum right-wing attitudes and prejudice. This result suggests that a 
reinforcing mechanism likely happened where those endorsing right-wing and 
prejudiced attitudes become more inclined to support far-right as well as right-
wing voters likely becoming more intolerant and bigoted over time. In effect, 
right-wing victories reinforce right-wingers’ views. This important finding is 
consistent with evidence that racist norms and incidents increased after Marie 
Le Pen’s 2012 race and Trump’s 2016 victory (Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016). 
This also points to possible polarization processes that occurred after the Brexit 
referendum, where adherents and opponents actively seek news confirming 
their own views, while minimalizing and even ignoring contradictory 
information. This phenomenon has also been observed after the victory of 
Trump; reports conflicting with the Trump worldview are typically rejected as 
“fake news” (Martinelli, 2017). We encourage future studies to delineate further 
these dynamics in other electoral contexts (e.g., Bolsonaro’s victory in Brazil). 
Finally, our results add a crucial piece of the puzzle that goes beyond 
previous research unraveling the complex and multifaceted factors explaining 
far-right support. By providing new insights into the simultaneous longitudinal 
effects of RWA, SDO and prejudice, we avoid “the single factor fallacy” 
(Pettigrew & Hewstone, 2017) by including critical individual difference 
variables into one coherent and comprehensive model. Additionally, we applied 
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longitudinal analyses, a necessary strategy for tentative claims of causal 
connections over time. Future studies could extend the current framework by 
including other social-psychological underpinnings of far-right support, such as 
perceived relative deprivation (e.g., Meuleman, Abts, Pettigrew, & Davidov, 
2019; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984), collective narcissism (de Zavala et al., 2017; 
Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, & Batayneh, 2018), restricted 
intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 2017; Knowles & Tropp, 2018), and political 
cynicism (e.g., Van Assche et al., 2018; Van Assche, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Roets, 
2019), and by examining the unique effects of these predictors in a single, 
unified model. 
A limitation of the current contribution involves our necessary use of 
short scales - particularly for our outcomes of interest. Moreover, the use of 
MTurk participants as in Studies 2a and 2b has been debated, especially with 
regards to research on political ideology (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 
2011). Nonetheless, liberals and conservatives in MTurk samples closely mirror 
the psychological divisions of liberals and conservatives in the mass public 
(Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015). Hence, this research will hopefully 
encourage future research to develop further the interesting theoretical 
framework of personality syndromes, intergroup processes and attitudes, and 
far-right adherence.  
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Notes 
[1] Keywords used for right-wing attitudes were (right-wing) 
authoritarianism, social dominance (orientation), their abbreviations RWA/SDO, 
conservative beliefs, social-cultural attitudes, economic-hierarchical and anti-
egalitarian (social-ideological) attitudes. Keywords for intergroup prejudice 
were (subtle/blatant/modern) racism, ethnocentrism, (ethnic/racial) prejudice, 
(outgroup) bias, intolerance, discrimination, outgroup attitudes, and anti-
immigrant attitudes. Keywords for far-right support were (Donald) Trump, 
extremist(s), populist(s), political preference, support, extreme (right-wing) 
party/parties, far-right, populism, and voting (behavior/intentions). We also 
checked the reference list of each relevant article for additional relevant studies 
and contacted key researchers to share relevant unpublished data. 
[2] Though informative and with findings consistent with other research, 
studies by Feldman (2017) and Van Hiel (2012) were excluded from this 
analysis because they do not meet the condition of a general sample. 
Specifically, Feldman (2017) used a Republican-only sample during the 
primaries of the 2016 U.S. election, and Van Hiel (2012) sampled only Flemish 
party members. Analyses that include these two studies yield virtually identical 
results and are available upon request from the first author. 
[3] Credibility intervals represent a range of values that includes the true 
effect size with 80% probability. 
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RWA, SDO and prejudice correlations with far-right support across different countries 
 
Study N Country Far-right indicator RWA SDO Prejudice 
Current Study 2a 154 U.S. Trump voting intentions .46*** .33*** .49*** 
Current Study 2b 252 U.S. Trump support .61*** .42*** .51*** 
Choma & Hanoch, 2017 406 U.S. Trump voting intentions .46*** .48***  
Crowson & Brandes, 2017 261 U.S. Trump voting intentions .54*** .45***  
Ludeke et al., 2018 1444 U.S. Trump support .34*** .38***  
Martens et al., 2018 260 U.S. Positive perceptions about Trump .62*** .41***  
Federico & de Zavala, 2018 1730 U.S. Trump thermometer rating .18***  .42*** 
Feldman, 2017 1741 U.S. Trump support .24***   
Conway III & McFarland, 2019 1115 U.S. Trump support .50***   
Wright & Esses, 2019 435 U.S. Trump support  .40***  
Current Study 3 603 U.K. UKIP support .46*** .34*** .49*** 
Current Study 3 603 U.K. Pro-Brexit attitudes .47*** .27*** .46*** 
de Zavala et al., 2017, Study 1 280 U.K. Support for the Brexit outcome .45*** .34***  
de Zavala et al., 2017, Study 2 226 U.K. Support for the Brexit outcome .37*** .36***  
Peitz et al., 2018, Study 2 400 U.K. Post-Brexit preferences .61*** .38***  
Zmigrod et al., 2018 332 U.K. Pro-Brexit attitudes .45***   
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Meleady et al., 2017 448 U.K. “Leave” voting intentions   .51*** 
Leone et al., 2014, Study 1a 390 Italy House of Freedoms preference .35*** .29***  
Leone et al., 2014, Study 1b 483 Italy House of Freedoms preference .36*** .31***  
Leone et al., 2014, Study 2 721 Italy House of Freedoms preference .47*** .39***  
Van Assche et al., 2018a 628 the Netherlands Freedom Party support .45*** .31*** .49*** 
Van Assche et al., 2018b 509 Belgium Flemish Block support .27*** .35*** .52*** 
Van Hiel, 2012 69 Belgium Flemish Block support .58*** .55*** .84*** 
Van Hiel et al., 2007 480 Belgium Flemish Block support .42*** .44*** .60*** 
Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002 381 Belgium Flemish Block voting preference .34*** .51***  
Meloen et al., 1996 901 Belgium Flemish Block sympathy rating .35***   
Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001  
Table 2 
 
Meta-analytic effect size estimates of RWA, SDO and prejudice with 
far-right support in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe 
 
Region Predictor r SDr SDres 95% Conf. Int. 80% Cred. Int. 
U.S. RWA .37 .15 .15 [.27; .47] [.18; .55] 
 SDO .40 .04 <.01 [.37; .43] [.40; .40] 
 Prejudice .44 .03 .01 [.41; .47] [.42; .45] 
U.K. RWA .48 .07 .06 [.42; .54] [.40; .56] 
 SDO .35 .02 <.01 [.33; .37] [.35; .35] 
 Prejudice .48 .02 <.01 [.46; .50] [.48; .48] 
Europe RWA .38 .06 .05 [.34; .42] [.32; .45] 
 SDO .37 .07 .06 [.32; .42] [.30; .44] 
 Prejudice .53 .05 .03 [.47; .59] [.49; .58] 
Total RWA .39 .12 .11 [.34; .44] [.25; .54] 
 SDO .38 .06 .04 [.35; .41] [.33; .43] 
 Prejudice .48 .05 .04 [.45; .51] [.43; .53] 
Note: r = mean uncorrected effect size; SDr = observed standard 
deviation of the effect size; SDres= true residual variance; Conf. Int. = 






Standardized results of the models testing the cross-sectional 
associations of RWA and SDO with voting intentions for Trump 
















Standardized results of the models testing the longitudinal 
associations of RWA and SDO with support for UKIP (Figure 2a) and 











Note: * p <.05; ** p <.01; *** p <.001 
 For the sake of parsimony, only significant longitudinal paths are 
portrayed. Full results are available upon request with the first author. 
 
 
